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CAUSATION AND COMMON SENSE
JOHN SHERMAN MYERS*
Cloud rolls over cloud: one train of thought suggests and is driven
away by another: theory after theory is spun out of the bowels of
his brain .. .flitting in the idle air and glittering only in the ray
of fancy."
There is nothing more fundamental in the law than the premisc that
no man is liable for injury to another unless he has caused it. And it is
equally true that no legal principle is easier to understand than this basic
conception: if the defendant's act' has no connection with the harm suf-
fered by the injured part', no liability, civil or criminal, will be placed upon
the defendant for that harm. The defendant, say. admittedly has fired a
gun, and an instant later a person within range is struck by a bullet-a
sequence of events which creates a strong inference that the defendant has
shot the injured person. But if it is proved that the bullet which brought
about the injury could not have been fired from the defendant's weapon,
the defendant's possible connection with the injury evaporates and he is in
no way liable for it.- While there has been some minor controversy relative
to the method of testing the connection of the defendant's act with the
injury suffered,3 if the problem of legal cause involved no more than this
question of actual causation, there would be n1o excuse for the complicated
'Professor of Law, The Washington College of Law of American University.
"IHAZLITT, r,E PLAIN SPEAKER, Bell Ed., 278 (1891).
1. Or, of course, his culpable failure to act. The difference, in connection with
causation, is clearly described in Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 t lARv.
L. Rav. 633, 637 (1920). In this article, wherever an act is mentioned, the thought
generally applies equally to a culpable failure to act.
2. Litigated cases supporting this proposition involve factual situations where the
lack *f connection between what the defendant did and the barni that was done is not
so obvious as in the utterly simple case supposed in the text. Some of the clearer cases
are: Berryhill Y. Nichols, 171 Miss. 769, 158 So. 470 (1935) (negligent treatment by
a physician of a wounded patient had no connection with the patient's death from a
blood clot that the best treatment would not have prevented); Lippold v. Kidd, 126
Ore. 160, 269 Pac. 210 (1928) (negligent failure of an eye specialist to discover a
splinter embedded in plaintiff's eye had no connection with the loss of the eye when it
was shown that the eye would have been lost even though the splinter had been promptly
discovered and removed); Stacy v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 84 \is. 614, 54 N.W. 1091
(1893) (negligent failure to barricade a hole in the ice had no connection with the loss
of a runaway horse which would not have been halted by a proper barrier, had one been
erected). '.. The collision would have occurred had the street car been standing
still.... . Tampa Electric Co. v. Jones, 138 Fla. 746, 190 So. 26 (1939). Cases on
this simple proposition are plentiful: Hatch v. Smail, 249 \Wis. 183, 23 N.W.2d 460
(1946); Dallas v. Diegal, 184 Md. 372, 41 A.2d 161 (1945); Iless v. Robinson, 109
Utah 60, 163 P.2d 510 (1945); Western & A. R.R. v. Frazier, 66 Ga. App. 275, 18
S.E.2d '5 (1941).
3. The so-called "hut for" rule (that the defendant's act is not in fact a cause of
the injury if the injury would not have happened "but for" the act of the defendant)
seems to be most often used by the courts, but it is inadequate to cover the ease where
the injury is the result of contemporaneous, although independent, acts of more than
one actor, any one of which by itself would accomplish the injury. See Kingston v.
Chicago & N.AV. R.., 191 Wis. 610, 211, N.W. 913 (1927). In such a case, the "but
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confusion that has developed and grown to such a degree that one eminent
writer has said "the subject of legal cause as an element in liability for
negligence has become a stench in the nostrils of Law Review editors" 4-a
rather broad statement and one which neither explains nor simplifies, al-
though it does indicates the need for a reconsideration of the subject, if for
no other purpose than to determine if it is really as bad, in an olfactory
sense or otherwise, as it seems.
CAUSATION IN FACT: TuE PROPER APPROACH
It is believed that one reason for the difficulties that the profession.
from judge to first year law student, has experienced with legal cause rests
in the fact that the proposition is usually expressed in the negative, as, for
instance: "the defendant is liable only for the natural and probable con-
sequences of his act," or that he "is not responsible for results that are re-
mote and not proximate" and other similar phraseology5 pointed to the idea
that defendant is not liable for injury to which he was a contributing factor
unless the law affirmatively recognizes his connection with the injury as
one which carries liability with it. This, and the use of poorly selected words
to describe this liability-carrying connection, as well as the poor use of the
words selected,6 have resulted in the lawyer approaching the problem from
the wrong side: he seeks affirmative authority that the defendant's act
was a "cause" of the kind to which liability attaches, attempting, as it were,
to overcome some sort of a presumption or inference that, prima facie, de-
fendant is not responsible in the eyes of the law for the harm his act brought
for" rule would produce the melancholy result that neither caused the injury since it
would have happened anyway because of the other. See McLaughlin, Proximate Cause,
39 H^Av. L. REV. 149, 153 (1925). A better test, now generally accepted, is that the
defendant has caused the result if his act was a "substantial factor" in producing it.
Walton v. Blauert, 256 Wis. 125, 40 N-W.2d 545 (1949); Simon v. Hudson Goal Co.,
350 Pa. 82, 38 A.2d 259 (1944); Krauss v. Greenborg, 137 F.2d 559 (3d Cir. 1943),
cert. denied 320 U.S. 791, 64 S.Ct. 207 (1943); Edgecomb v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 127
Conn. 488, 18 A.2d 364 (1941); Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry., 146
Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920). See also Restatement, Torts § 431 (1934); Peaslce,
Multiple Causation and Damage, 47 HARV. L. REv. 1127, 1128 (1934).
4. Scavey, Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 llRv. L. REV. 372, 383 (1939); 39
COL. L. REV. 1, 31 (1939); 48 YALE L. f. 371, 401 (1939). Prof. Seavey has imposed
two unnecessary limitations: The odorous disturbanc involves others than Law Review
editors, who may be suspected of developing a certain tolerance; and the problem of
legal cause is not restricted to negligence, but is an element in all legal liability. There
may be significance in the fact that the index of the Harvard Law Review shows that in
Volumes 1 through 47 (1887-1934) there appeared enough material on "Proximate
Cause" to fill more than two solid pages of small type. In Volume 47 through Volume
61, No. 1, (November, 1950) there is but a single reference tinder "Proximate Cause",-
hardly more than a passing mention contained in an article on recent developments in
torts. See Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 IIARv. L. REV. 1225, 1228 (1937).
5. The variety is infinite; citation of authority is of neither value nor importance.
6. I.e., "proximate cause," "legal cause," "natural and probable consequences." and
many others. See: Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARv. L. REV. 103, 115
et seq. (1911).
Courts have used the language of proximate cause when they mean the defendant
was not negligent: Jones v. City of Ft. Dodge, 185 Iowa 600, 171 N.W. 16 (1919);
when they mean that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent: lenry v. St. Louis,
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to'the injured party, and unless there is something in the applicable prin-
ciples that will overcome this "presumption," liability will not be imposed.
It should be added that this attitude is often nourished by the very nature
of the event in which the plaintiff was harmed. A border line case usually
involves an accident that has happened through a remarkable coincidence
of acts, timing, and physical conditions-so remarkable that the probability
of anything resembling it occurring again is so remote as to be virtually nil.7
In such a set of freak circumstances, involving a defendant who intended
no harm of this kind, the psychological reluctance of the court, even if un-
admitted, to pin responsibility on the negligent, although not evil minded,
actor,8 must be very real. This reluctance should be recognized as a partial
explanation for a court subconsciously9 approaching a hard case as one
where no liability should be imposed unless the rules affirmatively so re-
quire.
The proper approach to a problem in causation is this: the defendant
is prima facie liable for all injury that his act has been a substantial factor
in producing; unless there is some rule which limits that prima facie liability,
the defendant will be required to atone, civilly or criminally, for the harm
that he has thus caused. In other words, admitting causation in fact the
defendant is liable unless there is some rule applicable to his case which
limits that liability.'0
As noted above, the basic rule that in the absence of causation in fact
the defendant is not liable, is relatively simple. And if the converse were
true-that if there is causation in fact the defendant is liable-there would
be no difficulty with the problem at all. We know, of course, that this
converse rule is not true. It is believed, however, that this converse rule is
sufficiently close to the truth to warrant saying that it is true unless, and to
approach the problem from the viewpoint of the "unless"-to examine the
authoritative rules limiting the liability of the defendant for injury with
which his act was sufficiently closely connected to have been a substantial
K. C. & N. Ry., 76 Mo. 288, 43 Am. Rep. 762 (1882); when they. mean there was no
causation in fact: DeMoss v. Kansas City Rys., 296 Mo. 526, 246 S.W. 566 (1922);
when they mean that plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages: WVeeks v. Great Northern
Ry., 43 N.D. 426, 175 N.W. 726 (1919). This "jargon" also has been used to explain
holdings that there will be no recovery in certain cases of mental disturbance: Victorian
Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, L.R. 13 A.C. 222 "(1888); Ward v. West Jersey & S. R.R.,
65 N.J L. 383, 47 At. 561 (1900). See Throckman, Damages for Fright, 34 HARv. L.
REV. 260, 268 (1921).
7. For example, see the astonishing facts in Wood v. Pennsylvania R.R., 177 Pa.
306, 35 Ati. 699 (1896). And then compare, as to facts and as to result, but riot as to
reasoning, Palsgraf v. Long Island RR., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
8. There is less reluctance to pin liability for unexpected rseults on an intentional,
as distinguished from a negligent wrong-doer: "It is generally agreed that results intended
by an actor are proximate if they, in fact, take place." McLaughlin, supra note 3, at
151. See also: Peaslee, supra note 3: Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort
Liability, 46 IARv. L. REv. 453, 470 (1933). See RESTATEMFNT, TORTS § 501 (1934).
9. And sometimes consciously. See, for example, Cardozo, in I.R. Moch v. Rens-
sclaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
10. This was a premise of Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HAI. L. Rsv.
103, 103-4 (1911). It appears again in RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 431 (1934).
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factor in bringing it about. In so doing, we emphasize not so much rules
that establish liability, but those that save the defendant from the con-
sequences that he, in fact, has caused.
It must be noted at the start that there are several instances of limita-
tion of the defendant's liability that have nothing whatever to do with the
problem of so-called legal cause. In negligence cases, for instance, it is ele-
mentary that a successful action requires that plaintiff establish four ele-
ments, each of which is as essential as the other, and all of which are
equally essential if the plaintiff is to prevail. These, in brief, are as fol-
lows: 1'
(a) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff to use reasonable
care to avoid injury to the plaintiff;
(b) a failure of the defendant to live up to the duty so imposed-a
failure to use due care under the circumstances;
(c) a causal connection-that defendant's act, in fact as well as
legally, caused plaintiff's injury;
(d) real, and not nominal, damage to plaintiff.
Since each of the above is an essential element, the lack of which bars
recovery, it follows in every instance where liability is not imposed on de-
fendant for the results that, in fact, he has caused, there is a limitation of
his liability. There is nothing novel about such limitation of liability in the
absence of a duty, 12 or in the absence of a violation of duty, 13 or in the ab-
sence of actual damage,' 4 or in the absence of causation in fact.', With
this in mind, we can approach on a firmer foundation the question of further
limitations of liability based upon the law of legal cause-limitations of
liability in those cases where there was a duty which was violated, and
where such violation in fact was a substantial factor in producing actual
damages. Are there any such limitations? And if so, what are they?
11. PRossER, TOTS 177 (1941); cf. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 2
(1927); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 281 (1934).
12. Where there was a failure to use due care which caused actual damage to
plaintiff, but no duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, defendant is not liable:
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
13. Where there was a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, and an act of
the defendant which caused actual damage to the plaintiff, but where the act was not
negligent, defendant was not liable: Vaughn v. Menlove, 3 Bing. 468 (N.C. 1837), and
the hundreds of similar applications of the so-called standard of care.
14. Where there was a failure to use due care in violation of a duty owed by de-
fendant to plaintiff which caused the result of which plaintiff complains, but no actual
damage to plaintiff, defendant is not liable: Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231,
21 A.24 402 (1941); Sullivan v. Old Colony St. Ky., 200 Mass. 303, 86 N.E. 511
(1908).
15. Where the defendant's act was negligent and in violation of a duty owed to
plaintiff, -nd plaintiff suffered actual damage, but there was no causation in fact, de-
fendant is not liable: Cases cited note 2 supra, and the related text.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
An analysis of the ways in which causation in fact may take place'-
the ways .in which an act becomes a substantial factor in bringing about
injury-indicates that there are only two main classifications, which, for
convenience, may be termed direct causation and indirect causation. Direct
causation consists of those situations where the force created by the defend-
ant's act 7 itself comes into contact with the plaintiff or his property, or
where the defendant's act started into motion another force which brings
about the result. Indirect causation consists of those situations where the
defendant's force comes to rest before the damage is done to the plaintiff,
but in a position where it brings about a situation of increased danger to the
plaintiff, and, acting on the stage thus set, a new and independent force
intervenes and becomes the direct cause of the injury.
DIREcT CAUSATION
Cases where the causation is direct are readily identifiable for the most
part, as where the immediate result of the defendant's act is the injury com-
plained of;' 8 where there is a direct transmission of the defendant's force-
as the jolt felt in the rear car of a train when the engine is coupled onto the
front;'9 where the defendant's force aggravates an existing physical condition
peculiar to the plaintiff-as a latent disease; '" where the defendant's force
operates in connection with already operating forces-as the wind or tidc;2'
and where the defendant's force instigates the operation of a new force
which immediately causes the result-as the development of a septic con-
dition as an aftermath of a wound resulting from the defendant's act.2 '-'
One other class of cases is worth mentioning in this connection: where
the act of the defendant arouses action on the part of an animal or a human
being, and it is the latter force that brings about the plaintiff's injury. Beale
classified all such instances as cases of direct causation,23 but it would seem
16. 1 have found no better analysis of the ways, physical, metaphysical, and pIhilo-
sophical, in which causes operate to produce results than in Beale, supra note 1. For a
criticism of Beale's views, see Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 211 (1924).
And see McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 !tARv. L. REv. 149 (1925). 1 have derived
my analysis of the kinds of causal connections primarily from these three articles.
17. Or, in cases of culpable failure to act, the force that the defendant was obligated
to stem or divert.
18. Ilitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 1K2d 811, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Thompson v.
Lupone, 135 Conn. 263, 62 A.2d 861 (1948).
19. Mathews v. Kansas City Rys., 104 Kau. 92, 178 Pac. 252 (1919); Hill v.
Winsor, 188 Mass. 251 (1875); ef. Scott v. Shepherd, 2 V. B1. 892 (1773). Contra:
Wood v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra note 7. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., supra note 7
semble, in which see particularly the dissenting opinion of Judge Andrews, 2"t8 N.Y. it
347, 162 N.E. at 101.
20. Hahn v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 92 N.J.L. 277, 105 At. 459 (1918); Vatson
v. Rheinderknect, 82 Minn. 235, 84 N.\V. 798 (1901).
21. Romney March v. Trinity House, L.R. 5 Ex. 204 (1870). Wind can also be a
later factor, taking effect after defendant's act: Ilarverly v. State Line & S. R.R., 135 Pa.
50, 19 At. 1013 (1890).
22. Clarke v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 180 Cal. 76, 179 Pac. 195 (1919); Arm-
strong v, Montgomery St. Ry., 123 Ala. 233, 26 So. 349 (1899).
23. Beale, supra uote 1, at 646.
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that this would depend on the "rationality" of the act-its volumary
nature, as opposed to its being an instinctive reaction.24 Under this view,
where the action stimulated is that of an irrational animal,25 or the in-
stinctive reaction of a human being,26 it should be regarded as a force cre-
ated directly by the act of the defendant, but where the act aroused is volun-
tary, in the sense that the actor could exercise a choice, it is a case of in-
direct causation, to be decided according to the principles applicable to that
kind of a situation.
2 7
In these cases of direct causation the vast majority of courts impose
liability on the defendant for the plaintiff's injury, and have no difficulty
whatever with the fact that in many of these situations the end result of
which plaintiff complains was not only unforeseen, but actually was un-
foreseeable. Thus in the famous Polemis case,28 a plank was negligently
dropped into the hold of a ship and caused a spark which ignited gasoline
vapors. The fact finder concluded ". . that the causing of the spark could
not reasonably have been anticipated from the falling of the board, though
some damage to the ship might reasonably have been anticipated."2 ' In
holding for the plaintiff, the court emphasized: "But if the act would or
might probably cause damage, the fact that the damage it in fact causes is
not the exact kind of damage one would expect is immaterial, so long as
the damage is in fact directly traceable to the negligent act, and not due
to the operation of independent causes having no connection with the neg-
ligent act. . . Once the act is negligent, the fact that its exact operation
was not foreseen is immaterial." 30 Cases abound where the causation is
direct in the sense used above, and the defendants have been held respon-
24. McLaughlin, supra note 16. at 167.
25. In Loftin v. McGrainie, 47 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1950), steers being transported
escaped, and no effort was made to retake some of them until the next morning. Actions
of defendant's servants again terrified one steer, and he stampeded and injured plaintiff,
a bystander. In sustaining defendant's liability, the court said (47 So.2d at 302): "No
intervening cause is sufficient unless it is independent and not set in motion by the
original wrongful act." See also City of Fort Worth v. Patterson, 196 S.XV. 251 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1917); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Siuer, 229 II1. 390, 82 N.E. 362 (1907); Isham
v. Dow's Estate, 70 Vt. 588, 41 At. 585 (1898); McDonald v. Snelling, 14 Allen
(Mass.) 290 (1867).
26. In Rich v. Finley. 89 N.E.2d 213 (Mass. 1949), plaintiff was instructing a
student flyer when defendant dove his plane at the plaintiff's plane. The student "froze"
to the controls, and the plane crashed. The student's act was not an intervening cause,
but "one link in the chain" from the defendant's act to the end result. See also Bass v.
Seaboard Air Line R.R., 205 Ga. 458, 53 S.E.2d 895 (1949); Hill v. Wilson, 224 S.W.
2d 797 (Ark. 1949); Hubble v. Brown, 84 N.E.2d 891 (Ind. 1949); New York, C. & L.
R.R. v. Affolder, 174 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1949); Jefferson Hospital v. Van Lear, 186 Va.
74, 41 S.E.2d 441, 444 (1947); Hatch v. Smail, 249 Wis. 183, 23 N.W.2d 460 (1946);
Lentz v. Carolina Scenic Coach Lines, 208 S.C. 278, 38 S.E.2d 11 (1946); Duff v.
Bemidji Motor Serv. Co., 210 Minn. 456, 299 N.W. 196 (1941); Ogden v. Aspinwall,
220 Mass. 100, 107 N.E. 448 (1915); Scott v. Shepherd, supra note 19.
27. See note 54, infra, and the related text.
28. In re Arbitration between Polemis and Another and Furness, Withy & Co.,
[1921] 3 K.B. 560.
29. Id. at 563.
30. Id. at 577.
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sible. for results that are completely unexpected and unanticipated.A' In
many instances these courts emphasize, as did Lord Scrutton in the Polemis
case, the immateriality of the lack of foreseeability z - Indeed, the unanimity
of the judicial application of this principle was so great twenty or thirty
years ago that isolated contradictions were regarded simply as wrongly de-
cided.:3 Today, there are more instances of apparent contradictions, many
of which, however, can be fitted into the over-all picture on other reason-
ing. 4 But in 1920, the proposition was simply this: in cases where there
is causation in fact, and there is a direct and immediate consequence, the
great weight of authority and the better view is that there are no limitations
in the law of causation that will exempt the defendant from liability.
Today that relatively simple proposition in the law of legal cause re-
quires re-examination in only one respect: Is it so, as Beale contended,35
that apart from the consequences of the defendant's own force so long as
it continues active,' defendant also is responsible for the consequences of
another force created by his force, which second force was the direct cause
31. Watson v. Rheinderknect, 82 Minn. 235, 84 NWN'. 798 (1901) (where the
severity of the injury was greatly increased because of a prior war injury of which plaintiff
had been suffering long prior to the battery on him by this defendant); Thompson v.
Lupone, 135 Conn. 236, 62 A.2d 861 (1948) (where plaintiff's over-weight and nervous-
ness accounted for an extension of the normal recovery period from the negligent injury
caused by the defendant from two weeks to eight months); State v. O'Brien, 81 Iowa 88,
46 N\V. 752 (1890) (where the person assaulted by the defendant had heart disease
and died of fright). See also Kilduff v. Kalinowski, 136 Conn. 405, 71 A.2d 593 (1950);
Ethridge v. Nicholson, 80 Ga. App. 693, 57 S.E.2d 231 (1950); Barabe v. Duhrkop
Oven Co., 231 Mass. 466, 121 N.E. 415 (1919).
32. In addition to the cases cited in note 31 supra, see Ilitaffer v. Argonne Co.,
supra note 18; Rich v. Finley, supra note 26; Johnston v. City of East Moline, 405 111.
460, 91 N.E.2d 401 (1950): Mudrich v. Standard Oil Co., 153 Ohio St. 31, 90 N.E.2d
859 (1950); Straight v. B. F. Goodrich Co.. 354 Pa. 391, 47 A.2d 605 (1946); Crowe
v. McBride, 25 Cal.2d 318. 153 P.2d 727 (1944); Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 146 F.2d
765 (6th Cir. 1944); Derosier v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 81 N.H. 451, 130 At]. 451
(1925); Washington, A. & Mt. V. Ry. v. Luckens, 32 App. D.C. 442 (1909); Illinois
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Siler, supra note 25; Hill v. Windsor, supra note 18.
33. Wood v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra note 7. where the defendant's negligently
operated train struck a woman at a grade crossing and hurled her body against the plaintiff
waiting at a nearby station,-"Plaintiff's injury was a consequence so remote that de-
fendant could not reasonably foresee it." See 177 Pa. at 312, 35 Atl. at 701. See also
the strikingly similar facts in the Palsgraf case, supra note 7, where, in a divided court, the
plaintiff was also denied recovery, but the court was unanimous that the legal cause point
was clear for the plaintiff, the decision turning on the absence of duty.
Beale thought the Wood case did not follow the accepted doctrine and was incon-
sistent with an earlier Pennsylvania case, Bunting v. Hogsett, 139 Pa. 363, 21 Atl. 31
(1891). See Beale, supra note 1, at 650. Another inconsistent case, Hogan v. Bragg,
41 N.D. 203, 170 N.W. 324 (1918), was disposed of by Beale saying "This was a
decision by the notorious Robinson, J.," and later adds "Comment is unnecessary." See
Beale, supra note 1, at 648.
The necessity for foreseeability of result in cases of direct causation was generally
regarded as unsound even before Beale's article: I BEVEN, NEGLiGENCE 88 (3d ed.
1908); 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LTABILiTY 111 (1906). See also Bohlen, The
Probable or the Natural Consequences as the Test of Liability in Negligence, 40 Am. L.
Reg. (N.S.) 79, 159 (1901).
34. Infra note 66, and related text.
35. Beale, supra note 1, at 658.
36. The modern cases on this phase, cited in notes 31 and 32 supra, seem fully to
support this aspect of Beale's conclusions of 1920.
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of the result? And for the results of a third force which was created by the
second force which was created by the defendant's force, and so on, world
without end? We know from common experience that one force can
activate a third, and that the chain of force on force could progress unbroken
into what is, for all practical purposes, infinity. Judge Andrews, ably argu-
ing his dissent in the Palsgraf case,37 supposed the case of the car driver
who negligently collides with a car loaded with dynamite (although he did
not know it) and an explosion follows. A, walking on the nearby sidewalk
is killed. B, sitting near a window in an opposite building, is cut by flying
glass. C, likewise sitting by a window, but a block away, is similarly injured.
Ten blocks away a nursemaid, startled by the noise, involuntarily drops a
baby, D, to the sidewalk. Andrews had no doubt as to the ability of A and
B to recover, and little doubt as to C. But as to D, he felt clearly other-
wise: "We will all agree that the baby might not.'"38 Perhaps so, and it is
not difficult to agree, yet if we assume the action of the nursemaid to be
involuntary, then the fall of the baby is the result of a force created by the
driver's force, for which, tinder Beale's view, the driver would be respon-
sible.39
There must be obviously some point along the chain of direct causation,
in the sense of one force activating another, where the idea of liability is
repugnant to one's conception of basic justice. It would appear that this
point should be at the weakest link in the chain,-the point at which there
is no probable relation between a given force and the force next preceding
it in the series of events.
40
37. Supra note 7. 248 N.Y. at 353, 162 N.E. at 104 (1928).
38. See 248 N.Y. at 353, 162 N.E. at 104. McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 175,
note 80, carries the chain of force directly creating force nearly to the ultimate:' X, de-
siring to frighten A, a nervous and excitable person, comes behind A and says "Bool"
A happens to be combing his hair with a metal comb and starts violently, giving himself
a slight abrasion of the scalp. He immediately tries to put witch hazel on the wound.
but in his excitement grabs a similar bottle containing an acid and puts it on his head.
This so aggravates his pain that he seizes the first cloth at hand, a red flannel under-
garment, and takes a short cut to the doctor. The red cloth attracts a bull who butts A
into a barbed wire fence. Gangrene appeared in the wounds thus produced of which
A dies. Is X liable for the death?
One cannot refrain from calling to mind an ancient "Joe Miller": "My father
called an employee into his office and fired him. The employee got mad and picked up
an ink-well and threw it at my father's head. My father ducked, and the ink-well went
through the plate glass window into the street, and spilled ink on a lady's mink coat.
She went to the curb to shake off the ink, and it frightened a horse pulling a load of
expensive china, and the horse ran away and all the china was broken, and the horse
ended up in an antique store window and all kinds of rare' pictures were torn to pieces.
And now everybody is suing my father for dodging the ink well."
39. Supra note 26, and the related text.
40. See McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 169 et seq. See Engle v. Director General
of Railroads, 78 Ind. App. 547, 133 N.E. 138 (1921), where defendant's negligently run
train hit an automobile and threw it against a switch. The switch opened, the train
ran onto a siding and crashed into boxcars, injuring the plaintiff, a passenger. The court
said that the circumstances were so unusual and improbable that there was no liability.
In Cone v. Inter-County Tel. & Tel. Co., 40 So.2d 148 (Fla. 1949), the defendant's
negligently driven car collided with a gasoline truck, which ignited. Flames burned
plaintiff's telephone lines, interrupting service, and plaintiff's repairman was sent to the
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This limitation on the liability of the defendant who is at the starting
point of a series of cause on direct cause is treated in the Restatement of
Torts41 in this manner: Look back after the event, from the harm con-
planied of to defendant's original negligent act, and determine whether or
not it is "highly extraordinary" that the negligent act should have brought
about this effect. If it is highly extraordinary that this should have hap-
pened, then, although there is in fact direct causation, the act of the de-
fendant will not be the legal cause of the injury. We thus have a limitation
in the law of causation on the liability of the defendant for harm to which
his act in fact was a substantial contributing factor.
The difficulty with the application of this limitation to any given set
of facts is, according to the Restatement,42 that it is impossible to state
definite rules to determine whether a particular result of a force directly
created by the defendant's wrong is so highly extraordinary to prevent the
act from being a legal cause, because it is a matter for the judgment of the
court, formulated after the event, and therefore with knowledge of the
effect that actually was produced. This difficulty, if difficulty it is, seems
more theoretical than real, and, if it were left to the judgment of the jury,
rather than the court, as a matter of factual determination, would present
no more difficulties than many other applications of legal principles of a
general nature to the circumstances of a particular case.
43
scene. When he reached the vicinity, the gas truck was still burning, and he moved
in for a closer view. When he was still about 300 feet away, tile truck exploded and
he was injured. The telephone company and its insurer sue for his injuries. The court
indicated that the defendant was liable for the damage to the gasoline truck and its
contents, for injury to the driver, for damage to the lines, but' not for the injury to the
repairman. It would seem that the act of the telephone company in sending a repairman
to the scene of an accident which interrupts service, and the movement of the repairman
to the scene might be regarded as "involuntary,"-thc company "reacting" to the inter-
ruption of service, and the repairman obeying orders, both steeped in the tradition of the
telephone industry that service must be restored with minimum interruption. If it were
not for the act of the repairman in venturing closer when he saw that repairs were not
then feasible, the case would be a neat example of highly extraordinary results from direct
cause on direct cause. Nevertheless, the remarks of the court are well worth noting:
"The responsibility of a tortfeasor for the consequences of his negligent act must end
somewhere, and under our legal system the liability of the wrongdoer is extended only
to the reasonable and probable, not merely the possible, results of a dereliction of duty."
See 40 So.2d at 150.
41. RESTATEMENT, Toars § 435 (1934), and the corresponding section in the
1948 Supplement to the Restatement.
42. 1948 Supp. to RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 435, comment e. See also McLaughlin.
su/ra note 16, at 170, wheie he evidences the same difficulty with his "appreciably prob-
able" test.
43. See Derosier v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., su/ra note 32. See also, Jayne,
J.S.C., dissenting in Stewart v. Norton, 75 A.2d 900, 903 (NI.L. 1950). Consider tile
necessity for the jury to determine, as a matter of fact, whether the defendant exercised
the kind and amount of care that the ordinary prudent man would exercise under the same
circumstances in order to reach a conclusion as to whether the defendant was negligent.
Consider also the task of the jury in determining whether, in a criminal case, a "reasonable
doubt" exists. See Shumaker and Longsdorf, CYCLOPEDiC LAW DIclIoNARY 936 (3d ed.
Moore, 1940), or any standard law dictionary, to appreciate the difficulties of definition,
in spite of which the application of the principles by a jury works well in actual practice.
The Law abounds with similar analogies.
CAUSATION AND COMMON SENSE
It has not been over-looked, nor can it be ignored, that there is a con-
siderable segment of legal pedagogy that takes the position that this ques-
tion of the limitation of liability for highly extraordinary results directly
caused is not really a question of causation at all. They think the problem,
strictly speaking, concerns the determination of whether the duty imposed
on the actor is designed to protect the one harmed from the risk of injury
from the hazard which the defendant's wrong created.44  Indeed, the re-
porter of the 1948 Supplement to the Restatement of Torts45 seems apolo-
getic for discussing the matter under "Causal Relation" at all,46 and does
so only because the courts "frequently treat such problems as problems of
causation ."
47
This may be all very well for those writers and courts who agree that
the acceptance of the "risk theory" is a recognition of "the true nature of
the problem." 48  It happens that this writer is not one who has joined in
the acceptance of this proposition, largely because of an inability to agree
with the result or the reasoning of the majority in the Palsgraf case,49 which
seems to be the springboard from which the risk theorists dove into the
treacherous waters of the hazard approach. 50 For the realist who recognizes
that courts do decide these cases from the viewpoint of causation, and that
44. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 281 (1934) and 1948 Supp. § 281, comment ee, and
§ 435, comment c.
45. Laurence H. Eldredge.
46. 1948 Supp. to RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 281, comment ce (dealing with the duty
owed by the defendant to the plaintiff): "A completely accurate analysis of the hazard
element in negligence would require the material on superseding cause in Chapter 16 to be
placed in this chapter."
47. 1948 Supp. to RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 435, comment c.
48. 1948 Supp. to RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 281, comment cc.
49. Supra note 7. As to results: Plaintiff was injured by the fall of a scale on de-
fendant's railroad station platform, toppled over as a direct result of the negligence of
defendant's servants in assisting another prospective passenger to board a moving train,
causing him to drop an innocent looking package, which in fact was explosive and did
explode, rocking the platform and overturning the scale. The majority denied recovery
on the basis that there was no duty owed to this plaintiff which had been violated!
Accepting the principle of law applied (that an essential element in the plaintiff's case
in a negligence action is a violation of a duty owed to the plaintiff,-supra note 7, and
related text), to conclude in this situation that there was no such duty is almost incon-
ceivable. As to reasoning: The only thing that seems clearly expressed in the majority
opinion is the statement of the elementary principle that a duty to plaintiff must exist,
and that, if there was no duty, the . law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus
foreign to the case before us."
It is significant, it is submitted, that the Palsgraf case received considerable criticism
at and shortly after it was first decided: 29 COL. L. REv. 53 (1929); 24 ILL. L. REv.
325 (1929); 27 YALE L. J. 1002 (1928); see also Green, The Duty Problem in Negli-
gence Cases, 28 Col. L. Rev. 1014 (1928). Cf. Goodheart, Unforeseeable Consequences
Of An Act, 39 Yale L. J. 449, 465 (1930). It seems ironic that when the Palsgraf case
was decided, it was not commented upon in the Harvard Law Review's valuable "Recent
Cases" section.
50. Seavey, Cardozo and the Law of Torts, supra note 4. But of. GREEN, RATIONALE
OF PROXIMATE CAUSE V-VII (1927), written and published prior to the Palsgraf de-
cision. See further, Note, Impact of the Risk Theory on the Law of Negligence, 63
liARv. L. REv. 671 (1950). See, in general on the risk theory, Goodheart, supra, note
49 at 465 (1930); Wright, The Law of Torts: 1923-1947, 26 CAN. B. REv. 40, 60
(1948).
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the risk theory is receiving but slow judicial acceptance,5' the causation ap-
proach is there. It exists. It must be argued to the courts, applied by prac-
titioners, taught in the schools and grasped by the students. It must, in
short, be faced. The way to face it is to accept the fact that the majority
of the courts still utilize the causation approach and that there has evolved
a limitation on the basic idea that a wrongdoer is responsible for the direct
consequences of his act by exempting him from such liability when the
actual result, looked at from an after-the-event pinnacle, was in fact so highly
extraordinary that basic justice requires such a limitation.
INDIRECT CAUSATION
Contrasted with cases involving direct causation are those factual situa-
tions regarded as indirect causation,-where the defendant's act is a substan-
tial factor in bringing about the result of which plaintiff complains, and
where the other elements essential to his case appear,12 but where the force
set in motion by the defendant does not itself come into direct contact with
the plaintiff or his property, and does not directly create, or set in motion, a
force which does. Nevertheless, although spent itself, the defendant's wrong
creates a situation from which there is an increased danger of injury of some
kind. Acting on the stage thus wrongfully set by the defendant, a new and
independent force intervenes, and it is the new force that is the direct cause
of the result, made possible only by the previously active, but now spent,
force of the defendant. This situation is nicely illustrated by the well known
case of Gilman v. Noyes,3 where the defendant negligently left down the
bars of a fence on plaintiff's land, and certain sheep for which the plaintiff
was responsible wandered off and were lost,-apparently destroyed by bears.
It will be observed that there was no act of the defendant that stirred the
sheep into action, and that he did nothing to induce the gastronomical
activities of the bears. On the contrary, once he had left the bars down his
activities ceased, and everything that happened subsequently was due to the
roving ovine spirit, or the predatory ursal instincts, or both. But assuming
that the defendant's act was over and done, and his wrongful force was
spent, what was the result as things then stood? Obviously, an increased
hazard to the sheep-new dangers-new risks. Because of defendant's wrong,
a new range of theretofore improbable events became possible: the sheep,
as sheep will, were likely to roam; wild animals known to be in the locality
might now invade the sheepcote, undeterred by a barrier; roving sheep tend to
expose themselves to dangers appropriate to the area,-in the wilder country
to a fall over a cliff, to be lost in the brush, to injury from climatic changes,
to harm from eating poisonous vegetation, and in more settled areas to such
things as traffic on the public roads, and on the railroads, or theft. The list
51. See note, 63 HARvI. L. REV. supra note 50, at 672, where it is conceded that
the risk theory "has received but slow judicial approval since the Palsgraf case."
52. Subra note 11, and the related text.
53. 57 N.H. 627 (1876).
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is limited only by the imagination, and yet each of these possibilities pos-
scsses a degree of probability somewhere within the range between the cer-
tain and the impossible,-it is impossible, for instance, that the sheep will
be killed by ferocious field mice, but is certain that some fleece will be lost
by catching on low-hanging branches. Whatever the probability' of the
thing that happened, the likelihood that it would happen was, in fact, in-
creased by the defendant's act; he was a substantial factor in producing the
end result. Defendant is a cause of the injury. Does it follow that he will
be liable for anything that may be happen?
The doctrine seems generally well settled: the dcfendant will not be
legally responsbile for injury resulting from all intervening forces, but only
sonic of them: those forces that come within the scope of the increased
risk that the defendant has created. This is determined by applying to the
specific intervening force that directly caused the end result 4 the test of
whether it was, or reasonably should have been, anticipated or foreseen by
the defendant whose wrongful act set the stage. The determination of the
defendant's liability on causation principles in these situations depends
upon exactly this: if the intervening force, whatever it was, was reasonably
foreseeable, the defendant is liable;55 if it was not, he is not liable.56  The
determination of what was the nature of the intervening force that directly
caused the injury, and whether that force was foreseeable, are questions of
fact, to be handled exactly as any other factual determination.-'M
54. It is apparent that cases of indirect causation involve one phase of the problem
of multiple cause, which is somewhat beyond the scope of this article. See, for a good
discussion, Peaslee, supra note 3. In such a case the intervening force is the direct cause
which operates on the situation created by the defendant's act. Such intervening force
could be a natural force, as the extraordinary flood in Cole v. Shell Petroleum Co., 149
Kan. 25, 86 P.2d 740 (1939), or the normal storm in Derry v. Flitner, 118 Mass. 131
(1875); as non-culpable human agency, as the act of a person who attempts to save his
property placed in danger by the defendant's negligence in Illinois Central R.R. v. Siler,
supra note 25; a negligent human agency as the negligent driver who injured the plaintiff
forced into the street to avoid defendant's unlawful obstruction of the sidewalk in O'Neill
v. City of Fort Jervis, 253 N.Y. 423, 171 N.E. 694 (1930); or a criminal human agency,
as the act of the thief who entered the window negligently left open by the defendant
in Stansibie v. Troman, [1948] 2 K.B. 48. To the extent that the intervening force is
culpable, liability is imposed upon the wrongful creator of that force according to the
principles of direct causation discussed in this article. This liability, however, is apart
from the question of the liability of the defendant whose wrongful act has made the
harmful effect of the intervening force more probable in the indirect causation situation
now under consideration.
55. Northern Ind. Transit Co. v. Burk, 89 N.E.2d 905 (Ind. 1949); Maletovosky v.
Ilarshaw Chem. Co., 360 Pa. 279, 61 A.2d 846 (1948); McEvoy v. American Pool Corp.,
32 Cal2d 295, 195 P.2d 783 (1948); Cunrtis v. ]acobson, 54 A.2d 520 (Me. 1947);
Bronk v. Deveuny, 25 Wash.2d 443, 171 P.2d 237 (1946); Zatkin v. Katz, 126 Conn.
445, 11 A.2d 843 (1940); Byerly v. Thorpe. 221 Wis. 28, 265 N.W. 76 (1936); Brauer
v. New York Central & H. R.R., 91 N.I.L. 190, 103 Atl. 166 (1918); Benedict Pineapple
Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 55 Fla. 514, 40 So. 732 (1908); Gilman v. Noyes, sup ra
note 53; Derry v. Flitner, supra note 54.
56. Central Flying Service v. Crigger, 221 S.W.2d 45 (Ark. 1949); Waugh v.
Suburban Club Ginger Ale Co., 167 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Sexton v. Noll Constr.
Co., 108 S.C. 516, 95 S.F. 129 (1918); Miller v. Bahmmuller, 124 App. Div. 588, 108
N.Y. Supp. 924 (2d Dep't 1908).
57. In Gilman v. Noyes, supra note 53, the court indicated that the following ques-
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In one way, it is unfortunate that the profession did not adopt for
common use in connection with the intervening force in indirect causation
some word other than "foreseeable," or else adopt some other word to ex-
press the anticipation of harm element in the determination of the de-
fendant's negligence, for which "foreseeable" is also used., The two ques-
tions, as a result of this similarity of terminology, are easily confused. For
instance, in Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works,59 the valves installed by
the defendant in its waterpipes failed to operate during an unprecedented
frost. The case properly turned on the finding that the defendant was not
negligent in installing valves that failed to operate under such unforeseeable
conditions, but a less astute court 0 might have reached the same result by
following the reasoning of legal cause. If the question of the wrongful
nature of the defendant's act were disregarded, or even if it were assumed
that the act was wrongful, the relation of the act of installing the valves
to the damage was that of indirect cause,-the intervening force which was
the direct cause being the freeze, which, since it was unprecedented in
severity, was not foreseeable, and the defendant will not be held liable for
such results, even though it was a substantial factor in producing them.
Nevertheless, there is a substantial difference in the nature of the foresee-
ability in these two applications of the foreseeability concept.'"
In the determination of whether the defendant's act was negligent
(assuming a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff to do such act with
tions should have been submitted to the jury: a) were the sheep eaten by bears, and,
if so, b) was this a foreseeable danger?
58. To determine whether, in fact, the defendant, when he acted, was exercising the
kind and amount of care that the ordinary prudent man would use under the same cir-
cumstance (see PRossER, TORTs 224 (1941]) necessarily requires an appraisal by the
fact-finder of the danger or risk involved. If it is real enough for it to be deemed fore-
seeable to the reasonable man, then the defendant was negligent in failing to take the
necessary precautions to guard against it. This is elementary in the law of negligence.
See Louisville and N. R.R. v. Finley, 237 Ala. 116, 185 So. 904 (1939); Vaillancourt v.
Manchester Gas Co., 88 N.H. 95, 184 Atl. 353 (1936); Delair v. McAdoo, 324 Pa. 392,
188 At]. 181 (1936); Sullivan v. Creed, Ir. R. [1904] 2 K.B. 317. See also: HOLMES,
TuE COMMON LAw 144 (1881); Seavey, Negligernce-Subjective or Objective, 41 HARv.
L. REv. 1, 5 (1927).
59. 11 Ex. 781 (1856).
60. One who may be suffering from "... a confusion of ideas and of the thought-
less repetition of a familiar phrase without the intellectual exertion required to ascertain
its meaning and the limits of its application." See Throckmorton, Damages for Fright,
34 llav. L. REv. 260, 271 (1921).
In Sprigall v. Fredericksburg Hospital and Clinic, 225 S.W.Zd 232 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949), plaintiff was injured by slipping on defendant's waxed flobr. In arguing that the
wax was not the proximate cause of the injury, the court obviously was arguing that de-
fendant had not been negligent. See infra note 81, and the related text. In GREEN,
RATIONALE OF PROBABLE CAUSE 83 et seq. (1927), there are numerous examples of
judicial lapses of this nature.
61. Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REv. 1225, 1229 (1937): "It is
noteworthy that this test (the foresceability of the intervening force in cases of indirect
causation) is in words substantially that which determines whether a particular act or
omission is to be regarded as . . . negligent toward the particular plaintiff who had been
injured by it. There is, however, a difference in the degree and character of the fore-
seeability which is required in the two cases, a difference so great as to amount to a dif-
ference in kind." See also: Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 ll.xv. L. Rsv.
223, 242 (1911).
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due care), the question of foresecability is directed to harm in general to
the plaintiff, and not to the particular harm that may actually have oc-
curred. 2 In applying the foreseeability test to the intervening force in cases
of indirect causation, it is the force that actually intervened that must have
been reasonably foreseen, and not merely an injurious force in general,-it
is what did happen, not what might have happened. The defendant who
leaves a loaded gun in a place where it might be accidentally discharged
by some unauthorized person is quite clearly negligent in so doing, since
some injury from the discharge of the gun might reasonably be foreseen,
but whether this negligence is the legal cause of the injury of a plaintiff
wounded by the discharge of the gun will depend upon the nature of the
intervening agency that brings about the discharge. The defendant's negli-
gence is an actual indirect cause of plaintiff's injury in any event, but it will
be a legal cause only if the actual direct cause was or should have been
foreseeable. Thus, if the gun should fall, or be knocked over, and be dis-
charged, or if a small boy should play with it and fire it, the defendant will
be liable for the injury, 8 but if an escaping criminal, whose presence in the
neighborhood is unsuspected, should pick it up and wound a pursuer who
is attempting to prevent his escape, the unforeseeability of such an inter-
vening act would enable the defendant to escape liability.64
It should be observed at this point, that the foreseeable intervening
force which directly causes the injury in a situation involving, as to the de-
fendant, indirect causation, possibly could produce a "highly extraordinary"
result. If the foreseeable intervening force is a culpable force, we have
already established that the actor who wrongfully set it in motion is not
legally responsible for such unusual results. 5 It follows that the defendant
whose wrongful act increased the risk of injury from the thus foreseeable
intervening force equally will not be responsible for such result.
Thus we see, in the application of the foreseeability test to the inter-
vening force in cases of indirect causation, a second principle in the law of
causation which limits the liability of a defendant who has acted wrong-
fully toward a plaintiff and to whose actual damage he has been, in fact, a
substantial contributing factor. As an incident to the principle applicable
62. In re Polemis, supra note 28; Barabe v. Duhrkop Oven Co., Kilduff v. Kalinow-
ski; Ethredge v. Nicholson, all supra note 31.
63. Sullivan v. Creed, supra note 58.
64. Schwartz v. Jaffe, 324 Pa. 324, 188 Atl. 295 (1936); Miller v. Bahmmuller,
supra note 56; Andrews & Co. v. Kinsel, 114 Ga. 390, 40 S.E. 300 (1901); Alexander
v. Town of New Castle, 115 Ind. 51, 17 N.E. 200 (1888).
But note: The limitation on defendant's liability depends not on the fact that the
intervening force was wilfully or even criminally wrong, but on the fact that this pirtic-
ular wilful or criminal act was unforeseeable. There are numerous instances where a de-
fendant was held responsible for injury caused by an intervening criminal act: Stanshie
v. Troman, supra note 54; Malloy v. Newman, 310 Mass. 269, 37 N.E.2d 1001 (1941);
Brauer v. New York Central & H. R.R., supra note 55. See also Vaughn v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 213 P.2d 417 (Cal. App. 1950); Theurer v. Condon, 209 P.2d 311 (WAash.
1949); Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal.2d 213, 157 P.2d 372 (1945).
65. Supra note 35, the related text and following material.
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in certain cases of direct causation, but not as an additional limtiation of
liability, the defendant in a situation of indirect causation is not legally
responsible for the highly extraordinary results of an intervening force even
if it is foreseeable.
PRACTICAL APPLICATION
An anticipated criticism of this additional effort to reduce the law of
legal cause to a relatively few principles capable of simple expression"6 and
common sense application," is that it fails to explain the results reached by
the courts in certain well known and troublesome factual situations. It will
be found, however, that most of these cases do fit into the principles advo-
cated, or otherwise can be satisfactorily explainedYa
For instance, there is a substantial number of cases where the defend-
ant's wrongful act can be traced into insanity, mental depression or de-
lirium of the injured person, during which he takes his own life. In many
of these cases the result has been a refusal to impose liability on the de-
fendant for the death."" Upon proper analysis from the causation approach,
however, these cases present no basic difficulty. Assuming that the defend-
ant's wrongful act was in fact a substantial factor in bringing about the con-
dition that gave rise to the self-destruction, 70 either of the two fundamental
causal situations could be involved, depending upon the facts: the act of
the suicide may have been involuntary in the sense that it was an irresistible
impulse or an unthinking reaction, in which event it would have been
directly caused by the defendant and he will be legally responsible" unless
it can be said that the death was a highly extraordinary result;7 2 or the act
66. Beale's final summary of the legal requirements of "proximity of result" took
four printed lines. See Beale, supra note 1, at 658.
67. "Theorize as we may on the subject of proximate cause, it is, in its last analysis
a question of good common sense, to be solved by a practical consideration of the evi-
dence in each particular case." Moores v. Northern Pac. Ry., 108 Minn. 100, 101, 121
N.W. 392 (1909). See infra note 106.
68. A reconciliation of all the cases in all the books? Colman said it, in The Maid
of the Moor: ". . . what's impossible, can't be."
69. A leading case is Seheffer v. Washington City, V.M. & G.S. R.R., 105 U.S. 249
(1882), of which Beae said: "This opinion seems hardly reconcilable with the current
of authority on this subject." See Beale, supra note 1, at 645. Did the fact that the de-
fendant was a railroad, and that, at the time, railroads were in high favor have any sub-
conscious effect on the result? See ihfra note 101, and the related text.
70. A question of scientific fact. Cf. Migliaccio v. Public Service Ry., 101 N.I.L.
496, 130 Atl. 9 (1925), where the court felt it had not been factually established that
the tuberculosis which resulted in death was causally connected with the injury from the
defendant's wrong.
71. Stephenson v. State, 205 Ind. 141, 179 N.E. 633 (1932); Wilder v. Russell
Library Co., 107 Conn. 56, 139 Atl. 644 (1927); Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H, R.R.
Co., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424 (1903). The Stephenson case is noteworthy since it
involved a successful prosecution for murder where the death was the direct result of the
suicide of the victim of the defendant's rape while distracted by pain and shame. See 81
U. or PA. L. REv. 189 (1933) and 45 tIARV. L. REv. 1261 (1933).
72. Supra note 40, and the related text, semble: [ones v. Stewart, 183 Tenn. 176,
191 S.V. 2d 439 (1946), where the case turned on the court's belief that no reasonable
person would have expected a healthy young man to commit suicide because lie was
falsely accused of crime.
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of the suicide may have been a voluntary act, and the causation situation is
iidircct, in which case the liability of the defendant will depend upon the
foresceability of the intervening force, here the act of suicide.73
A second line of cases in which there has been substantial difficulty
from the viewpoint of legal cause is where a carrier wrongfully delays the
movement of plaintiff's goods and later resumes it, only to have the goods
lost as a result of flood, storm, or cold. The diversity of result reached in
this type of case has created considerable confusion, 74 but, properly analyzed,
there is no insurmountable difficulty from the viewpoint of the law of legal
cause. Initially, a basic question is whether the stoppage, as distinct from
the resumed carriage, was in fact a substantial factor in causing the dam-
age,-in other words, would the injury have happened had the delay not
taken place? If the halt did not increase the risk of the loss that happened,
the wrongful act added nothing to the already dangerous situation. But
where the causation in fact is established and the delay is a substantial
factor, either because the storm would have been avoided or its damaging
effects lessened if the carriage had not been wrongfully interrupted, the
case presents a situation of indirect causation, and the defendaht's liability
should be determined by the foreseeability of the injury that took place.76
A third line of cases where it has been thought that the law of causation
presents difficulties is those situations of indirect causation where the inter-
vening force (the direct cause) is an intentionally or even criminally wrong-
ful act. These cases have been touched upon,7 7 but the often expressed be-
fuddlement warrants further consideration. Actually, on causation princi-
ples, there is nothing significant in the fact that the intervening force may
have been criminal,-the determination of the defendant's liability still
73. Sufra notes 55 and 56, and the related text. See Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy,
212 S.C. 485, 48 S.E. 2d 324 (1948). Defendant was held legally responsible for a
voluntary suicide in Stephenson v. State, supra note 71; Carrigan v. Kennedy, 19 S.D. 1I,
101 N.W. 1081 (1904).
Defendant was held not legally responsible for a voluntary suicide in Jones v. Stewart,
supra note 72; Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 Fed. 92 (2d Cir. 1921); Daniels v. New York,
N.H. & H. R.R. Co., supra note 71.
74. See Beale, supra note 1, at 655. Only the leading cases need be cited: Denny
v. N.Y.C. R.R., 13 Cray Mass. 481 (Mass. 1859) and Mieheals v. New York Central
R.R., 30 N.Y. 564, 86 Am. Dec. 415 (1864). Many authorities are collected in Grant-
Wheeler Shoe Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 130 Iowa 123, 106 N.W. 498 (1906). The
high duty imposed upon a carrier to transport safely may be an important factor in im-
posing liability in these cases: PRossER, TORTS 367 (1941).
WVhere the defendant whose liability is limited was a railroad, did that fact, and the
fact that railroads at the time of the decision were in high public favor, have any sub-
conscious effect on the result? See infra note 10t, and the related text.
75. See Douglas, Burt & Buchanon Co. v. Texas & P. Ry., 150 La. 1038, 91 So.
503 (1922). Compare those cases in which the risk created by the defendant's wrogful
act has been "cured" by a subsequent act. and the hazard removed: Pittsburg Reduction
Co. v. Horton, 87 Ark. 576, 113 S.V. 647 (1908); Chadock v. Plummer, 88 Mich. 225,
50 N.W. 135 (1891). Semble: Kingland v. Erie County Agric. Soc., 298 N.Y. 409,
84 N.E.2d 38 (1949).
76. The Mariner, 17 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1927); Bell Lumber Co. v. Bayfield
Transfer Ry., 169 Vis. 357, 172 N.W. 955 (1919); Fox v. Boston & Maine R.R., 148
Mass. 220, 19 N.E. 222 (1889).
77. Sutpra note 54.
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should depend upon the foreseeability of that particular intervening act. 8
A case which resulted in no liability for a perhaps foreseeable intervening
criminal act is The Lusitania,7' involving the suits instigated for the deaths
and injuries of passengers resulting from the sinking of the vessel by a Ger-
man submarine during World War I. It will be remembered that the
waters into which The Lusitania sailed and where she was torpedoed were
well known to be infested by submarines, and that the German government
had publicly announced its intention of sinking her if she attenipted to run
the blockade. In denying recovery, the principal ground relied on by the
court was the independent illegal act of the submarine that intervened, but
making no mention of its forcsec-ability. The result, poorly reasoned as
it may be, can be rationalized on two grounds: (I ) Was the ship negligent
in venturing into the danger zone,-was it something that the ordinary pr-
dent man might do, in spite of the risk, under the circumstances? If the
ship were not negligent, there is no basis for liability at all, irrespective of
the law of causation. 10 (2) Assuming negligence, was the intervening act
of the German submarine in sinking an unarmed passenger ship, with hin-
dreds of non-combatants, including women and children, aboard, and in
the fact of almost certain involvement of the United States in the war, in
fact foreseeable? These questions were only incidentally raised, and there
was no mention of assumption of risk by the plaintiffs, but while the answers
to these questions might justify the result reached, the unsound basic rea-
soning of the case remains, and it must be regarded, at best, as questionable.
Due to the international importance of the incident involved perhaps this
district court case has received more attention than it deserves.
Other cases that may be pointed to as instances where the basic princi-
pies here advocated do not fit in with the decisions of the courts can be
explained by the fact that the court utilizes the language of causation to
reach a result that depends on some other well known legal principle. For
instance, one court has concluded that the defendant's highly waxed floor
was not the "proximate cause" of plaintiff's slipping and falling, when the
slightest application of common sense tells us it was. The creation of a
highly waxed floor sets the stage, and the intervening act of someone enter-
ing and falling is clearly foreseeable. All the court was driving at (and his
meaning can be disinterred by a careful reading of the opinion) was that
78. Foreseeable: Stansbic v. Troman, supra note 54; Cox v. Ilorasky, 318 III. App.
287, 47 N.E.2d 728 (1943); Jones Co. v. State, 122 Me. 214, 119 Atl. 527 (1923);
llies, Dir. Gen. of R.R. v. Garrett, 131 Va. 125, 108 S.E. 690 (1921); Braier v. New
York Central & II. R.R., supra note 55. Contra: Andrews & Co. v. Kinscl, supra note 64;
tlenderson v. Dade Coal Co., 100 Ga. 568, 28 S.E. 251 (1897) .
Unforeseeable: Wancbo v. Gates, 227 Minn. 194, 34 N.W. 2d 695 (1948); Miller
v. Bahimuller, supra note 56; Alexander v. Town of New Castle, supra note 64.
79. 251 Fed. 715 (S.D. N.Y. 1918). Is it possible that the court 'nay have bcci
shocked at the extent of the liability incurred by the defendant if the result were other-
wise? Was the defendant negligent? See 251 led. at 729. Was the intervening illegal
act foreseeable? Sec 251 Fcd. at 736. See infra note 99, and the related text.
80. See C KF.N. RATlrm .L.: OF PROnAoI.F CA IS I S (1927).
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there was no evidence in the case that defendant was negligent in applying
the wax, either as to the place or manner of application, and that the infer-
ence of negligence sometimes permitted by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
would not arise in that jurisdiction merely from the fact that the floor was
waxed. In the absence of adequate proof of negligence, the plaintiff's case
fails."' Similarly, the courts may say that because of the plaintiff's negli-
gence, the defendant's negligence is not the "proximate cause" of the injury:
all that is being done by the court is to apply the familiar rule of contribu-
tory negligence. 2
Apart from these cases where the courts use the vocabulary of legal cause,
there is a very important segment of cases where limitation of liability has
been granted to the defendant for the results of his wrongful act where all
the elements of liability8 3 exist, and where the usual application of the
accepted principles of the law of causation do not warrant any limitation.
Certain of these cases present familiar problems, such as the question of
recovery for fright, or mental or emotional disturbance, generally denied
in the absence of physical manifestation, and still denied in some jurisdic-
tions in the absence of physical contact.8 4  This is a question outside of
the scope of this article, except to point out that the reasons given by the
court when the liability of the defendant is limited, are not related to the
law of causation, but depend upon such things as difficulty of proof of
causation in fact, of foreseeability for the purpose of establishing negligence,
difficulty of calculating damages, the possibility of fraud and the opening
of a wide field for fictitious claims, all totalling to the conclusion that it
was not safe, as a matter of policy, for the courts to deal with these claims
unless accompanied by at least physical manifestation, if not bodily con-
tact.8 5
There have been other instances in the law of torts where the liability
of the defendant for the wrongful injury he has caused is limited by some
reason of policy, real or fancied, expressed by the courts. Thus began the
doctrine of Winterbottom v. Wright,4 limiting the liability of a manufac-
turer or supplier for his negligence, 'for which he would ordinarily be liable,
when the injured party was not "in privity" with the defendant,-a policy no
longer generally recognized,"' although still occasionally applied in cases
S1. Springall v. Fredericksburg Hospital and Clinic, supra note 60.
82. Henry v. St. Louis, K.C. & N. Ry., supra note 6, which note also see for other
analagous examples of improper use of causation language. Legal cause can be found
under the applicable principles of causation where the plaintiff has been contributorily
negligent: Regina v. Holland, 2 Moo. & Rob. 351, 174 Eng. Rep. 313 (1841). But see
I)antzler Shipbuilding & Drydocks Co. v. Hurley, 119 Miss. 473, 81 So. 163 (1919).
83. Supra note 11, and the related text.
84. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts. 49 IIARV.
L. REv. 1033 (1936); PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 216 (1941). See
also RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§306, 312, 313 (1934).
85. See Orlo v. Conn. Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941).
S6. 10 M.&.V. 109 (1842).
87. MacPherson v. Buick Moto Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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involving contractors who construct or make repairs."' Such also is the
basis for the so-called "New York rule" in cases of spreading fires, limiting
the liability-of the defendant to the damage done by his negligent fire to the
adjacent buildings, 9 for although the court used language indicating the
more distant destruction to be the "remote" results, the real reason for the
decision was the expressed feeling of the court that a contrary holding would
create a liability against which no prudence could guard, and to award a
punishment quite beyond the offense committed. In H. R. Moch v. Rens-
selaer Water Co.,9 where the defefidant negligently failed to supply water
at proper pressure for fire hydrants after notice of the existence of a fire, and
but for this failure the damage to the plaintiff's building would have been
lessened, the court limited the liability of the defendant largely because of
a reluctance thus to impose liability on this essential public utility. And
in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,11 a certified public accountant who negli-
gently prepared a balance sheet that lie knew would be used for the establish-
ment of credit was protected against liability to a banking house which had
relied thereon in extending credit, fearing that undue imposition of liability
would be prejudicial to accountants and other professional men (including
lawyers) to a degree that would injure the entire professional element of
the community.
Where there is this desire of the courts to reach a result contrary to
that called for by the normal application of accepted legal principles, which
result the court believes would be prejudicial to the best interests of the
community, there are two roads open to it: to hew to the line and decide
the case according to the law applicable, leaving it to the legislature to enact
such statutory changes92 as it, the representative of the public, finds appro-
priate; or the court may decide itself to establish and apply the policy.
Should the court adopt the latter course,93 it may do so in one of two ways:
otpenly declare the policy, and refuse to reach the result called for by normal
88. See, for instance, Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926). The trend is
to eliminate even this limitation; PROSSER, TORTS 694 (1941).
89. Ryan v. New York Central R.R., 35 N.Y. 210, 91 Am. Dec. 49 (1866). The
rule seems followed nowhere else, and it has been limited in New York: Homac Corp.
v. Sun Oil Co., 258 N.Y. 462, 180 N.E. 172 (1932).
90. 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928). Apparently a minority view. See 45
HARv. L. REV. 393 (1932).
91. 225 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
92. A familiar principle. For example, in Tudevine v. Benzies-Montayne Co., 222
Wis. 512, 269 N.W. 295 (1936), the court refused to recognize a right of privacy on
the facts alleged and admitted by demurrer, indicating that if a right of action for viola-
tion of the right of privacy is to be created it is more fitting that it be created by the
legislature.
93. There is no reason why the court should necessarily refrain from so doing. The
argument based on legislative action to change the court's result is as strong when the
court recognizes or creates policy as when it ignores it; in either event it is the legislative
prerogative, subject only to constitutional limitations, to reverse the court conclusion. In
Robeson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902), after the
court had denied the existence of a right of privacy, a statute was passed creating the
right in certain situations. See N.Y. Civ. RTs. L.w § 50; N.Y. Laws 1903, c. 132, § .
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applicatibn of the legal principles, as in the named cases discussed above,
4
or the court may distort some established legal principle; or apply the undis-
torted principle in an unorthodox way, in order to reach the result desired.
When the court forthrightly establishes an exception to the normal
result, there can be but little quarrel, even though one might disagree with
the policy expressed and applied. Indeed, there well may be instances, in
which such action would prevent the imposition of a literally ruinous
liability that would destroy a valuable and essential community asset before
effective remedial action by the legislature could be takenY5s Such excep-
tions to general rules of legal liability in order to limit responsibility are
at least understandable, and, most important, do no violence to the estab-
lished system of rules and do not offend the straight thinker, since, as stated
exceptions, they are recognized as such and can be dealt with accordingly.
When, however, the limitation of liability is achieved by the court's
distortion or unorthodox application of accepted legal principles, whether
done deliberately or subconsciously, trouble resultsy The distortions and
unorthodoxies tend to become perpetuated, the law becomes confused, and
the stench arises.97
In the named cases discussed in the text above 8 we knew, because the
court pointed it out, the policy that was behind the result reached. But no
one knows the degree to which the court in The Lusitania9 was appalled
subconsciously at the enormity of the damage the defendant had incurred
if liability were to be imposed. 0 0 And equally, no one knows the extent
to which the courts in the last half of the 19th century were disposed, sub-
consciously, to help the development of railroads by occasional limitation
of liability, although there is basis for believing that there was such a dis-
94. Supra notes 85-90, and the related text.
95. For example, on Thanksgiving Eve, 1950, there was a disastrous wreck on tile
Long Island Railroad in which there were some eighty deaths and scores of injuries.
According to newspaper accounts (Washington, D.C., Post, Nov. 23, 1950, p. 1) the
Long Island Railroad, already bankrupt and operating at a deficit, is actually the busiest
railroad in the world, and the sole efficient means of transportation to and from New
York City for thousands upon thousands of commuters living on Long Island. At this
writing, the reasons for the disaster have not been announced, but assuming the facts
warrant imposition of liability according to accepted legal principles properly applied,
and that the aggregate damages that would result were so large as to force discontinuance
of the road, would a court perhaps be justified in somehow limiting liability by the ap-
plication of some appropriate policy if, with intellectual honesty, one can be found?
Should the Long Island Railroad be permitted by this device to continue in its essential
service to the community even at the cost to the injured of bearing the burden of damage
that the railroad actually caused by its wrongful act? Perhaps the answer is a comprom-
ise: that under these conditions the entire community should bear the burden. It so,
it is a matter for the legislature and not the courts.
It is an interesting coincidence that this is the railroad the liability of which was
limited in the PALSGRAF case, supra note 7.
96. In this type of case we seldom know whether the court was deliberately trying
to reach a result and rationalizing at the expense of legal principles or their application,
or whether it was subconsciously diverted from the true path. In either event the results
illustrate the adage that "hard cases make bad law."
97. See Seavey supra note 4, and the related text.
98. See notes 85-90 supra, and the related text.
99. See note 79 supra, and the related text.
100. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 158 (1927).
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position.10 1 Did Cardozo and the majority of the New York Court of Ap-
peals in the Palsgraf case 0 2 have a subconscious urge to hold the Long
Island Railroad harmless in a "freak" accident with unusual results and, in
order to do so, apply an accepted legal principle (that a successful negli-
gence action requires violation of a duty owed to the plaintiff) to the facts
in an unorthodox way to permit the conclusion that there was no such
duty? Did Judge Dean and the others of the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania in the Wood case' 03 feel a similar subconscious urge to hold for the
Pennsylvania Railroad and, in order to do so, apply a distorted rule of causa-
tion (saying that an obviously direct cause required foreseeability of result)
to the facts? These two cases of startlingly similar facts, including an injury
almost unbelievingly unexpected, reached the same result: a limitation
of the liability of a wrong-doing defendant for damage in fact directly
caused by his wrongful act. That these results were identical carries far
more significance than do the diverse methods by which the respective
courts reached those results. 104
SUMMARY
Assuming all other elements essential to impose liability on a defendant
are present, the basic principles in the law of causation are these:
1. A defendant is not legally responsible for any injury unless, in
fact, his culpability is a substantial factor in bringing it about.
2. A defendant is legally responsible for all injury that his culpa-
bility is, in fact, a substantial factor in bringing about, unless:
a) the situation involves, as to the defendant, direct causation in
the sense that his force directly activates another force which brings
101. "It may be noted that the early cases against railroads are particularly strong
in favor of defendants." See McLaughlin, supra note 8, at 162.
102. See note 7 supra.
103. Ibid.
104. Further reference to the numerous examples would be redundant, but in Iten-
derson v. Dade Coal Co., sujra note 78, the defendant negligenly permitted a dangerous
convict, described as "a man of violent passions, prone to a desire for sexual intercourse"
(characteristics well known to the defendant), to escape, and while at large he committed
a particularly atrocious rape of the plaintiff. The reason that the defendant was respon-
sible for the custody of this prisoner was that the right to his labor had been leased from
the State, and the contract as provided. The tears of the court for the plaintiff did not
prevent limitation of the defendant's liability, and this was achieved on the basis that
as a matter of law the intervening criminal act was not reasonably foreseeable, a strange
application to these facts where the foreseeability seems so apparent that it might have
been so held without the aid of a jury. Certainly there was a jury question on this so
essential item. One cannot but wonder the degree to which the court may have been
subconsciously influenced in its decision by an awareness of the effect of imposing liability
on the lessee of prisoners who negligently permit an escape for the foreseeable crime they
may commit while at large. The added potential liability might make the utilization of
prison labor so risky that the state's revenue from this source would be substantially de-
creased. In lines v. Garret, supra note 78, where the state's interest was absent, the
court held a defendant liable for the rape of a plaintiff who had been exposed to such
offense by the negligent act of the defendant.
CAUSATION AND COMMON SENSE
about the injury, and the actual result is deemed, after the event, to
have been highly extraordinary; or unless
b) the situation involves, as to the defendant, indirect causation
and the independent intervening force is not, in fact, reasonably fore-
seeable; or unless
c) the court, for reasons of policy, or similar reason satisfactory
to it, sees fit to limit the liability of the defendant by specifically ex-
empting him from liability from the normal application of causation
or other principles.
Caveat: Cases in which the courts seem to have desired a given result
limiting liability and, in an attempt to rationalize to tl.t result, have dis-
torted established rules into rules which permit the desired result in the
factual situation involved, or have applied the established rules to the factual
situation involved in an unorthodox manner which permits the desired
result, are anachronisms and have no place in a logical system of law based
on decided precedents.
"The question of proximate cause, in its legal acceptance, is, or ought
to be, a practical question of common sense. '" '
105. Ruffin Coal & Transfer Co. v. Rich, 214 Ala. 633, 108 So. 596 (1926). See
note 67 sulra.
